The Critical Minerals Race Is Ignoring Africa

Washington talks about critical minerals largely through the lens of dependence on China. Beijing sees them as part of a much broader industrial strategy built around refining, chemicals, batteries, magnets, electronics and manufacturing. Europe is spending heavily to diversify supply. Japan and South Korea are securing long-term access to materials their industrial bases cannot function without.

Much of that discussion treats Africa as the place where the ore comes from.

That assumption deserves far more scrutiny. Africa already supplies around 75% of the world's manganese, roughly 70% of cobalt and nearly 20% of copper. The same continent currently captures less than 1% of the value generated by manufacturing clean-energy technologies and their components.

That disparity is the industrial opportunity. African countries do not need to win every stage of every mineral supply chain. They need to stop accepting extraction as the natural endpoint of their comparative advantage.

Congo Has Already Proven That Producer Policy Can Move a Global Market

The Democratic Republic of Congo is the obvious place to start because cobalt supply is extraordinarily concentrated there.

Congo spent years supplying the battery industry while most of the higher-value chemical processing occurred elsewhere. The economic arrangement was familiar: capital and technology arrived at the mine, intermediate material left the country, and a much larger portion of downstream value accumulated closer to the refiner, cathode producer and battery manufacturer.

Then Kinshasa demonstrated how much influence a dominant producer can actually have.

Restrictions on Congolese cobalt supply contributed to prices rising by around 130%. The IEA now expects the country's export policy to materially affect the global cobalt balance through the next decade.

In 2026, Congo went further by prohibiting exports of copper and cobalt concentrates, subject to certain waivers. The objective is explicit: more processing inside the DRC and a greater share of mineral economics retained locally.

The policy is already more credible for copper than previous attempts because domestic processing capacity has grown. Congo is no longer shipping the majority of its copper production as raw concentrate. Large-scale smelting investment has changed what the country can realistically require from miners.

That distinction matters. Export restrictions work better when local infrastructure gives producers somewhere economically rational to process the material. Financely has covered the wider financing problem in its analysis of the critical minerals financing paradox in Africa.

A Raw Export Ban Without a Refinery Is Mostly a Threat

Congo also provides a warning for policymakers tempted by aggressive resource nationalism.

Previous restrictions on copper concentrate exports repeatedly required exemptions because there was insufficient domestic smelting capacity. Miners cannot process hundreds of thousands of tonnes of material in a refinery that has not been built.

Smelters and refineries need enormous amounts of power, water, chemicals, transport infrastructure and working capital. They also need predictable feedstock, technically competent operators and buyers for the resulting refined product.

These projects can cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Larger facilities can run into the billions.

Governments therefore need to sequence industrial policy properly. Announce the direction early, create economically credible transition periods, improve the infrastructure, make the refinery financeable and tighten export rules as domestic capacity becomes available.

The financing mechanics are covered in Financely's metal refinery project finance guide. Refining policy without a financing strategy simply moves the bottleneck from the mine gate to the proposed processing plant.

Zimbabwe Is Using Lithium to Force the Processing Question

Zimbabwe has become Africa's largest lithium producer and an important feedstock supplier to China.

In 2025, Zimbabwe exported approximately 1.128 million tonnes of spodumene concentrate to China. That was roughly 15% of Chinese lithium concentrate imports.

Zimbabwean policy has now moved toward quotas, export taxes and mandatory commitments to local lithium sulphate production. A ban on concentrate exports is scheduled for 2027 under the current framework.

The private sector has responded. Huayou has already invested roughly USD 400 million in a Zimbabwean lithium sulphate plant. Other Chinese mining groups have announced processing plans of their own.

This is an important result even though Chinese capital remains deeply involved. Zimbabwe is using its position in the mineral supply chain to change where part of the processing occurs.

The more interesting competition is therefore not whether China disappears from African mining. China is already there and will remain there.

The competition concerns the terms on which Chinese, American, European, Gulf, Japanese and other investors receive long-term access to African resources.

Mozambique Is Moving in the Same Direction With Graphite

Mozambique is one of the world's largest graphite producers. Graphite is a critical anode material, and its downstream processing remains heavily concentrated in China.

Mozambique's new mining legislation requires greater local processing and gives the state a 15% free-carried interest in mining projects. Raw or semi-processed exports can face restrictions unless the government approves an exemption and a local processing plan.

Processing capacity is already appearing.

In January 2026, Mozambique inaugurated a Chinese-owned graphite processing facility in Niassa with capacity of around 200,000 tonnes per year. The developer has invested about USD 200 million and currently employs close to 900 people, with further expansion planned.

Whether Mozambique eventually moves into spherical graphite and battery-grade anode material will be more important than the simple fact that another mine opened. Each processing step reduces the share of value that automatically leaves the country with the ore.

Morocco Shows What Happens When Minerals Meet Industrial Policy

Morocco offers a more advanced example because it has spent years building the industrial capabilities surrounding the mineral base.

The country has abundant phosphate resources, a major automotive manufacturing industry, established export infrastructure and privileged access to large foreign markets.

Those assets are now attracting battery investment.

More than USD 15 billion of battery-related investment has been announced in Morocco. Gotion High-Tech is developing an integrated battery gigafactory with an initial investment of roughly USD 1.3 billion. The African Development Bank approved a €100 million loan for the project in July 2026 and intends to mobilize up to another €141 million from financing partners.

The facility is expected to manufacture LFP batteries as well as cathode and anode materials.

Morocco's advantage does not come from possessing a mineral in isolation. The advantage comes from connecting the mineral to automotive demand, ports, industrial zones, electricity, trade agreements, capital and manufacturing capability.

This is closer to the model the rest of the continent should study.

Extraction gets attention because the mine is visible and commodity prices are easy to quote. Industrial ecosystems create more durable negotiating power because the buyer eventually becomes dependent on a cluster of infrastructure, workers, suppliers and processing capacity that cannot be replicated overnight.

Zambia Should Be Thinking Beyond Refined Copper

Refining should not become another ceiling.

Zambia is already a major copper producer with an established mining and metallurgical base. UN Trade and Development recently examined what the country could manufacture using capabilities that already exist in its economy.

The result was surprisingly broad.

UNCTAD identified 412 products into which Zambia could realistically diversify. Seventy-three are directly connected with energy-transition mineral value chains.

Copper bars, rods, tubes and electrical conductors are obvious examples. Industrial chemicals, fabricated metals, machinery and electrical equipment also make economic sense because Zambia's mining industry already consumes many of those products.

UNCTAD estimates at least USD 1.4 billion of potential additional exports from the identified opportunities. A validated subset requiring around USD 1.21 billion of investment could support roughly 115,000 jobs across the economy.

These are much more meaningful development economics than simply increasing copper tonnage.

A mine can employ thousands of people and generate substantial tax revenue. A mining-centered industrial cluster can create demand for engineering companies, chemicals, transport, fabrication, electrical equipment, maintenance, software and financial services.

The mine becomes the anchor customer for an economy rather than an enclave connected mainly to an export terminal.

Botswana Has a Shot at a Market China Currently Dominates

Manganese offers another useful case.

Africa already dominates mined manganese supply. China dominates battery-grade manganese sulphate processing.

Botswana's K.Hill project is designed to produce high-purity manganese sulphate rather than simply export manganese ore. Planned output is approximately 80,000 tonnes annually.

That is strategically relevant because China currently controls around 95% of battery-grade manganese sulphate production according to the IEA.

Botswana does not need to replace Chinese supply to create a successful industry. A credible alternative supplying even a modest portion of a highly concentrated global market can attract Western, Asian and battery-sector customers seeking diversification.

Africa Should Use Foreign Competition, Not Pick a Patron

The geopolitical framing around critical minerals constantly asks whether African countries will side with China or the West.

African governments should resist that premise.

China needs diversified access to raw materials to protect its enormous processing and manufacturing base. The United States wants alternative supply chains because Chinese concentration has become a strategic vulnerability. Europe needs resources for batteries, grids, defense, electrification and industrial policy. Japan and South Korea have the same problem. Gulf investors are looking for hard-asset exposure and industrial opportunities abroad.

That creates competition for access.

Mineral-producing countries should negotiate accordingly.

A foreign investor offering only mine development and export infrastructure should compete against investors willing to finance processing. A processor should compete against groups prepared to add chemical production. A refinery proposal should be compared with a broader industrial investment involving manufacturing, supplier development or infrastructure.

The winning proposal should be the one that delivers the best risk-adjusted long-term economics for the host country while remaining profitable enough for investors to keep deploying capital.

The Lobito Corridor Can Either Change the Model or Reinforce It

The Lobito Corridor is usually discussed as a geopolitical answer to Chinese influence in central African mining.

That understates its economic significance.

The roughly 1,300-kilometer railway links the Angolan port of Lobito with the DRC mining region and Zambia's Copperbelt. Lower logistics costs can make mines more competitive and reduce dependence on existing export routes.

The World Bank has made the more important point: lower transport costs can also make it economical to move ores and intermediate products between regional processing facilities. That creates the possibility of smelting, refining, manufacturing and industrial parks along the corridor.

The Bank has also warned that the employment and development benefits will be much smaller if Lobito becomes primarily a faster mine-to-port system for low-value exports.

That is the choice in one sentence.

Africa can build better infrastructure for exporting minerals or use the same infrastructure to support industries around those minerals.

Regional Specialization Is More Credible Than 54 National Supply Chains

Industrial policy can also go too far.

Every African country with a mineral deposit does not need its own complete battery supply chain. That would fragment capital, duplicate infrastructure and leave many plants operating below efficient scale.

Regional specialization is much more credible.

Congo and Zambia have obvious copper and cobalt advantages. Zimbabwe has lithium. Mozambique, Madagascar and other countries can build around graphite. South Africa, Gabon and Botswana have manganese opportunities. Morocco has phosphate chemistry, automotive manufacturing and increasingly battery production.

The African Continental Free Trade Area can connect those capabilities into a regional industrial market.

The African Union's Green Minerals Strategy already points in this direction. It calls for Africa-wide value chains, regional content rules, beneficiation, manufacturing and coordinated industrial development around minerals including cobalt, copper, graphite, lithium, manganese, nickel, phosphates and rare earths.

The strategy even proposes using common tariff policy to encourage processing of green minerals before export. That is much more powerful when implemented regionally because a processor can serve a continental market rather than depending on domestic demand in one relatively small economy.

Cheap and Reliable Power Will Decide Who Wins

Processing minerals is energy intensive.

A government can write the strongest local-content legislation in the world and still lose the refinery if industrial electricity is unreliable or too expensive.

This is one of Africa's largest constraints. Roughly 600 million people on the continent still lack reliable electricity access. The same grid deficiencies that suppress household consumption also limit the competitiveness of smelting, refining and manufacturing.

Critical-minerals policy and power-sector policy therefore belong in the same investment plan.

A copper refinery with captive hydropower or dependable low-cost generation has a very different financing profile from one exposed to rolling outages, diesel backup and uncertain tariffs.

The countries that solve industrial power first will have a much easier time enforcing local beneficiation later.

Financing Costs Are Part of the Industrial Policy

The economics of an African refinery can be sound before financing and unattractive after financing.

A project paying double-digit dollar borrowing costs competes against an established Asian processor financed at a fraction of that rate. Political risk, sovereign ratings, foreign-exchange exposure and underdeveloped domestic capital markets all affect the final cost of processed output.

This is where development finance institutions should play a much larger role.

The major multilateral development banks explicitly committed in April 2026 to support critical-minerals-to-manufacturing value chains through better project preparation, infrastructure investment, guarantees, co-financing and private-capital mobilization.

That mandate should be used aggressively.

Political-risk insurance can reduce the premium demanded by commercial lenders. Partial credit guarantees can lengthen tenor. Concessional tranches can make strategic infrastructure bankable. Export credit agencies can finance imported processing equipment. Local pension funds can eventually provide domestic currency capital to established industrial assets.

Policy Stability Is Worth More Than a Punitive Royalty Rate

Governments also need to recognize what frightens long-term industrial capital.

A company can tolerate a demanding tax regime if the economics remain attractive and the rules are predictable. Investors struggle much more with a fiscal framework that changes after every election, an export ban announced without warning or a licence that becomes politically negotiable after hundreds of millions of dollars have been committed.

Processing plants have long payback periods. Their financing depends on confidence that feedstock rights, fiscal terms and export rules will remain sufficiently stable to service ten- or fifteen-year debt.

African countries can demand more local value without making themselves unfinanceable. Clear transition periods, published formulas, grandfathering where appropriate and enforceable investment agreements are much more effective than policy shocks.

Better Geological Data Would Strengthen Africa's Hand Further

Africa's existing production figures are impressive, but the continent is still underexplored relative to several mature mining jurisdictions.

Governments need modern geological surveys, accessible datasets and transparent cadastral systems so investors can identify resources without depending entirely on expensive private exploration.

Better geodata also improves the government's negotiating position because policymakers understand the mineral base before licences are awarded.

Exploration capital remains essential. Financely works with sponsors seeking capital for greenfield mining and exploration projects in Africa, where financing necessarily begins with geology, licence quality, technical work and a credible development pathway.

China Has Already Understood Africa's Strategic Position

Western governments often discuss Africa as a place where China needs to be countered.

Chinese mining companies have spent years doing something much more concrete: acquiring assets, financing production, securing offtake and increasingly building processing capacity close to important mineral deposits.

Zimbabwean lithium, Congolese copper and cobalt, Mozambican graphite and Moroccan battery investment all show different versions of the strategy.

Western governments now have to decide how seriously they want alternative supply chains. Speeches about diversification will matter less than the cost, tenor and execution certainty of the financing they are prepared to mobilize.

The United States Is Already Spending Public Money to Rebuild the Same Capabilities

The policy response in the United States makes Africa's negotiating position easier to understand.

Washington is committing grants, loans and other public support to lithium extraction, cobalt processing, recycling and battery materials because dependence on concentrated foreign refining capacity is now considered an economic and national-security risk.

Advanced economies are effectively paying to recreate processing capacity they allowed to concentrate elsewhere.

African mineral producers should take the lesson seriously. Refining and processing capacity has strategic value beyond the immediate margin earned on one tonne of material.

Africa Has More Leverage Than It Is Using

Global supply chains need more copper for grids and electrification. Battery demand exceeded 1.5 TWh in 2025 and grew by more than 35% in one year. Refining remains highly concentrated across most important energy minerals.

The market is actively looking for diversification.

Africa already controls a large portion of the underlying geology. That gives governments a negotiating asset that many industrial economies would pay heavily to possess.

Using that asset effectively requires more discipline than simply increasing mining royalties.

It requires reliable electricity, rail and ports. It requires transparent mining codes and credible courts. It requires long-term capital for refineries and industrial infrastructure. It requires technical education. It requires regional trade rules that let one country's mineral base support another country's industrial capacity.

Above all, governments need enough policy consistency for investors to commit capital while retaining enough resource leverage to demand meaningful local value.

The Critical Minerals Race Will Be Decided in More Places Than Washington and Beijing

The U.S. versus China narrative is convenient because both countries have enormous balance sheets, technology companies and industrial policy machinery.

The physical minerals still have to come from somewhere.

Congo has already shown that cobalt policy can move global prices. Zimbabwe has enough lithium supply to influence Chinese markets. Mozambique is pushing graphite processing. Botswana is targeting battery-grade manganese. Zambia has identified hundreds of industrial products that can grow out of its copper base. Morocco is already attracting billion-dollar battery manufacturing.

These are early stages of a much larger shift.

Africa will lose the opportunity if resource policy becomes unpredictable, infrastructure remains inadequate and every country attempts to build an isolated national supply chain.

With competent reforms, the continent can occupy far more profitable positions in copper, cobalt, lithium, manganese, graphite and phosphate value chains. In selected segments, its resource advantage is large enough to make African processing capacity strategically difficult to bypass.

The next critical minerals map should show more than where the mines are located. It should show where the refineries, chemical plants, fabrication facilities, battery-material plants and industrial clusters are being built.

Africa already has the minerals. The valuable question is how much of the industry surrounding them it intends to keep.